Development record
2026-10-16 — The product thinker ruled that the forge's team (organisation) settings change only through its website, never through a command line, and that the machine's forge login holds no organisation-admin scope, so no agent on the machine can change the team's settings by accident; reading the settings is fine (iss-2610161732283346).
decisiondcn-2610161803389940
2026-10-16 — The product thinker ruled that the forge's team (organisation) settings change only through its website, never through a command line, and that the machine's forge login holds no organisation-admin scope, so no agent on the machine can change the team's settings by accident; reading the settings is fine (iss-2610161732283346).
Frontmatter
| id | dcn-2610161803389940 |
|---|---|
| type | decision |
| date | 2026-10-16 |
.abcd/work/decisions/dcn-2610161803389940-the-product-thinker-ruled-that-the-forge.md
open on GitHub ↗ · commit history ↗
mentions1
- iss-2610161732283346abcd should warn when the machine's forge login, or the team's settings, hand agents more power than abcd needs. On 2026-10-16 the product thinker found, only by asking, that this machine's gh login carried admin:org (change the team organisation's settings, members and roles) and that the organisation let members delete repositories. abcd never calls the organisation API, so it needs neither. The product thinker turned member deletion off in the web UI, chose to remove admin:org, and ruled that team settings change only through the website, never through the command line. abcd's install and health checks should surface these risks unprompted, read-only, and leave the change to the person in the browser. Related: itd-2610161647248332 (abcd finds out what the forge can do).