2026-10-18 — An autonomous session acts on the forge as the person, through the App (facilitator-on-delegation, itd-2610170634394993 planning prep): every commit stays authored by the person, since the attribution gate refuses a machine as author or committer; the session pushes and opens pull requests with a token the repository's App mints for the person, limited to the permissions both the App and the person hold and expiring after eight hours, so its work shows the person's name marked as made through the App; the App's own bot identity is not used, because the forge's who-am-I endpoint does not answer for it, so a cloud session could no longer resolve its reservation holder; this meets the product thinker's ruling of a weaker credential of the session's own, which concerns the credential, not the name (grounds: the draft's decision 5; AGENTS.md attribution; scripts/check-attribution.sh; brief invariant 10; docs.github.com generating-a-user-access-token-for-a-github-app; docs.github.com endpoints-available-for-github-app-installation-access-tokens)

Frontmatter

.abcd/work/decisions/dcn-2610180723332655-an-autonomous-session-acts-on-the-forge.md
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mentions3

• adr-2610222026262980Coordination between headless agents is bounded by deadlines, fenced by the claim's tip, version-checked, and done under each session's own credential
• dcn-26102220480692842026-10-22 — A session's own token is a user access token from the device flow, and its refresh token stays on the person's computer (facilitator on the product thinker's delegation of 2026-10-14 for technical choices grounded in the state of the art, itd-2610170634394993; keeps dcn-2610180723332655, the person's name marked as made through abcd, which the product thinker accepted in the 2026-10-22 C3 question): the person authorises abcd's GitHub App once through the device flow (a code entered in the browser), which needs only the App's client id, so no client secret is shipped to any machine, and a device-flow token is refreshed without the secret; the refresh token, which lasts six months and is replaced at each refresh, is the only issuing secret, and it is kept on the person's computer in the system's credential store (the macOS keychain, or a file only the person's account can read under ~/.abcd.noindex on Linux), outside every session and on the fence's read-deny list; at each unattended launch abcd on that computer refreshes and hands the session only the eight-hour access token, through abcd's own credential channel; a container or a separate user account on the same computer is handed a fresh token before the old one lapses, and a cloud session cannot be reached after launch, so its pushes stop when its token lapses and its remaining pushes are queued as owed work for the person's return or a relaunch, which the walk states; the token reaches only the repositories the App is installed on, so abcd asks for the App to be installed on the one repository; the installation token stays the fallback behind the forgecred seam, with the commit author still the person, should the device flow be withdrawn (grounds: docs.github.com/en/apps/creating-github-apps/authenticating-with-a-github-app/generating-a-user-access-token-for-a-github-app; docs.github.com/en/apps/creating-github-apps/authenticating-with-a-github-app/refreshing-user-access-tokens; docs.github.com/en/apps/creating-github-apps/about-creating-github-apps/best-practices-for-creating-a-github-app)
• itd-2610170634394993Headless agents in parallel coordinate through the shared remote, not conversation