This is the record of an abcd-managed repository

abcdBetav0.16.2 · 2026-11-06

Development record

2026-10-18 — Only the person sets the away mode, its push rights are narrow, and the guard's refusal is a mistake filter (facilitator-on-delegation, itd-2610180912189125 review round 2, choice (a); refines dcn-2610180913399042, replacing its clause that an agent sets the mode on the person's word): the prompt hook cannot tell the person's message from one another session relays, and its input names no origin, so a relayed word could let an agent grant itself, and every copy, push rights. So the guard refuses every route to setting the mode that it reads: `abcd mode autonomous` by the binary on PATH, the plugin root's binary or a built `abcd-<goos>-<arch>`; a `go run` of a package ending in `cmd/abcd`; any of them inside `sh -c` or in a script file a shell runs (adr-2610091150447054); a shell write into the away store under `~/.abcd.noindex/away/`; and an Edit or Write tool call on a path inside it. The person sets the mode with their own `!` command, which the host runs directly without going through Claude and so without the pre-tool hook, or at a terminal. A refused attempt is recorded in the store and shown to the person on the next prompt. What the mode grants is the session committing and pushing its own branches and opening their pull requests; never the default branch, a tag, a release cut, another person's pull request, a branch this copy only checked out to review, or a force push; merging follows the repository's own rule. This is chosen over the fallback, and is enough for now, because the grant only governs an agent that follows refusals: one that ignores them can push without any mode, so no shape of the mode adds a boundary inside the person's own session; the guard stops a refusal-following agent from granting itself on a relayed word; the rights are narrow, and every push is reversible and visible on the forge; and the record (who set it and from which copy) and the recorded refusals leave a trail the person reads on return. The guard stays a mistake filter (adr-42, and the decision of 2026-10-17 on the default branch that keeps the headless approver one, naming the OS fence as the boundary). That fence (spc-2610161751056096) is the boundary only for agents abcd's runner launches, whose writes to abcd's home it confines to their own worktree; it does not fence the person's own interactive session, where the stall happened, so there the narrow grant and the trail are the mitigation. The fallback (the mode grants no push rights, and the person's own standing instruction stays the authority to push) applies instead if the live capture shows that a message relayed from another session can run as a `!` command, or that an agent's tool call can reach the host's shell mode (grounds: plan review round 2, choice (a), and the coordinator's two addenda; the host's interactive-mode page, which says shell mode runs commands directly without going through Claude and outside the sandbox that applies to Claude's commands; the abcd-source-ledger-flip guard entry; adr-2610161621415708)

decisiondcn-2610181003456444

2026-10-18 — Only the person sets the away mode, its push rights are narrow, and the guard's refusal is a mistake filter (facilitator-on-delegation, itd-2610180912189125 review round 2, choice (a); refines dcn-2610180913399042, replacing its clause that an agent sets the mode on the person's word): the prompt hook cannot tell the person's message from one another session relays, and its input names no origin, so a relayed word could let an agent grant itself, and every copy, push rights. So the guard refuses every route to setting the mode that it reads: abcd mode autonomous by the binary on PATH, the plugin root's binary or a built abcd-<goos>-<arch>; a go run of a package ending in cmd/abcd; any of them inside sh -c or in a script file a shell runs (adr-2610091150447054); a shell write into the away store under ~/.abcd.noindex/away/; and an Edit or Write tool call on a path inside it. The person sets the mode with their own ! command, which the host runs directly without going through Claude and so without the pre-tool hook, or at a terminal. A refused attempt is recorded in the store and shown to the person on the next prompt. What the mode grants is the session committing and pushing its own branches and opening their pull requests; never the default branch, a tag, a release cut, another person's pull request, a branch this copy only checked out to review, or a force push; merging follows the repository's own rule. This is chosen over the fallback, and is enough for now, because the grant only governs an agent that follows refusals: one that ignores them can push without any mode, so no shape of the mode adds a boundary inside the person's own session; the guard stops a refusal-following agent from granting itself on a relayed word; the rights are narrow, and every push is reversible and visible on the forge; and the record (who set it and from which copy) and the recorded refusals leave a trail the person reads on return. The guard stays a mistake filter (adr-42, and the decision of 2026-10-17 on the default branch that keeps the headless approver one, naming the OS fence as the boundary). That fence (spc-2610161751056096) is the boundary only for agents abcd's runner launches, whose writes to abcd's home it confines to their own worktree; it does not fence the person's own interactive session, where the stall happened, so there the narrow grant and the trail are the mitigation. The fallback (the mode grants no push rights, and the person's own standing instruction stays the authority to push) applies instead if the live capture shows that a message relayed from another session can run as a ! command, or that an agent's tool call can reach the host's shell mode (grounds: plan review round 2, choice (a), and the coordinator's two addenda; the host's interactive-mode page, which says shell mode runs commands directly without going through Claude and outside the sandbox that applies to Claude's commands; the abcd-source-ledger-flip guard entry; adr-2610161621415708)

Frontmatter

iddcn-2610181003456444
typedecision
date2026-10-18

mentions11