The adversarial-review principle has no armed detector: adversarial-review-scales-with-blast-radius requires two independent reviews before an intent moves drafts/ to planned/ (and one before an ADR is accepted), but nothing refuses the move without them. The enforceable rung: intent ready (and the record checks) refuse the transition unless review receipts exist in the .abcd/work/reviews/ VSA shape for the draft at its reviewed content hash

The adversarial-review principle has no armed detector: adversarial-review-scales-with-blast-radius requires two independent reviews before an intent moves drafts/ to planned/ (and one before an ADR is accepted), but nothing refuses the move without them. The enforceable rung: intent ready (and the record checks) refuse the transition unless review receipts exist in the .abcd/work/reviews/ VSA shape for the draft at its reviewed content hash Corroboration (2026-09-20, Gropius session gropiusllm-97, relayed to abcd-17). Met from the managed-repository side at v0.9.0: the planning interview's prerequisite of two adversarial reviews (design/feasibility and record-discipline) was carried out on a draft, and the session found no record shape the readiness gate could count, so the prerequisite is enforced by the session's own honesty. The intent surface page says as much ("the readiness gate that will refuse the move mechanically is a recorded seed until built"); this record is that seed. The ask is a receipt the reviews leave on the draft (reviewer lens, date, verdict, findings applied or rejected) that intent ready reports as a check and plan refuses without.

Remedy grounds (2026-09-29)

Why: the principle already sets two reviews before planned, and a receipt keyed to the content hash is what stops a review of an earlier draft counting for a changed one. Rejected: counting DECISIONS.md lines as reviews, which is the unauditable prose the corroborating session found.