Development record

2026-10-22 — abcd looks for the person's forge login before it starts an unattended run, and refuses to start where it finds one (facilitator, on state-of-the-art grounds, applying the product thinker's 2026-10-22 ruling C1 on itd-2610170634394993): before an away-mode run, build or drain starts unattended, and before abcd issues the session a token of its own, abcd checks only signals that carry no secret: the forge CLI's login status for the host by exit code alone, with its output discarded (the CLI prints no token unless asked with --show-token); whether the token variables the forge CLI and git read (GH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN and their enterprise forms) are set, never their values; and whether the stored-credential files hold an entry for the host (the forge CLI's hosts file and ~/.git-credentials), by the host line alone. It never asks a git credential helper for the host, since a helper answers with the token itself and on macOS may raise a keychain prompt that hangs an unattended start; so a login kept only in a keychain is out of the check's sight, and the refusal says so rather than claiming the machine is clean (brief invariant 16). It refuses to start, naming each place it found a login, and never removes or hides one; the guarantee rests on where the run is started (a cloud session, a container or a separate user account), which abcd states as the person's setup step. The session's own token, issued after the check, never travels in those variables (grounds: cli.github.com/manual/gh_auth_status; cli.github.com/manual/gh_help_environment; git-scm.com/docs/gitcredentials; adr-2610222026262980 rule 4)